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ABSTRACT
We provide a new axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices
in the domain of simple superadditive games by means of transparent axioms. Only
anonymity is shared with the former characterizations in the literature. The rest of the
axioms are substituted by more transparent ones in terms of power in collective decision-
making procedures. In particular, a clear restatement and a compelling alternative for the
transfer axiom are proposed. Only one axiom di®erentiates the characterization of either
index, and these di®erentiating axioms provide a new point of comparison. In a ¯rst step
both indices are characterized up to a zero and a unit of scale. Then both indices are
singled out by simple normalizing axioms.
Key words: Power indices, voting power, collective decision-making, simple games,
axiomatization.
21 Introduction
Shapley-Shubik (1954) proposed the specialization of the Shapley (1953) value to assess the
a priori measure of power of each agent in a collective decision-making procedure modelled
as a simple game. Assuming their interpretation of power as the chance to be critical for the
passage of a decision, Banzhaf (1965, 1966) criticized the weights that the Shapley-Shubik
index gives to coalitions of di®erent sizes and proposed his own index. These indices had
no axiomatic foundation till Dubey (1975) and Dubey and Shapley (1979) axiomatically
characterized them on the class of simple games. Since then, several axiomatizations of
both indices have been proposed (Owen (1978, 1982), Bolger (1982), Lehrer (1988), Haller
(1994), Feltkamp (1995), Nowak (1997), Albizuri and Ruiz (1999) and Khmelnitskaya
(1999)). The main motivations of these papers are either the mathematical challenge of
¯nding a self-contained characterization in subclasses of TU-games (like simple games or
simple superadditive games) or the lack of intuitive appeal of some axioms. In the process
new indices have even been proposed (Deegan and Packel (1978), Johnston (1978), Holler
and Packel (1983)). However it can be said that so far no power index is characterized
by means of an intuitively compelling set of axioms (Felsenthal and Machover (1995)).
Moreover, the axiomatic approach by itself is insu±cient to settle the question of the
choice of a power index (Laruelle (1999)).
The aim of this paper is to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik and the
Banzhaf indices as measures of power in collective decision-making procedures. Conse-
quently our domain is the class of simple superadditive games. Indeed, the basic informa-
tion specifying a collective decision-making procedure, that is, which coalitions can make
a decision and which cannot, can be represented by a (0-1)-game, while monotonicity and
superadditivity are natural requirements that guarantee some consistency of the proce-
dure. With this aim in mind, we look for a set of clear and transparent axioms, that is,
assumptions that, whatever their plausibility, have a clear meaning and make sense one by
one, independently of the others. In particular, no importance is attached to the one/zero
values of the characteristic function of a simple game describing a decision rule beyond
the yes/no information they embody.
Our starting point and basic reference are the axiomatizations proposed by Dubey
(1975) and Dubey and Shapley (1979), who characterize both indices by a set of four
axioms. Three of them ("anonymity", "null player" and "transfer") are common to both
indices, while the fourth one ("e±ciency" and the below-called "Banzhaf total power")
distinguishes both indices. If mathematically very elegant, these characterizations are
not completely satisfactory in the context of simple superadditive games as models of
decision-making procedures. Indeed, the meaning of the "transfer" axiom is a bit obscure.
3Similarly the di®erentiating axioms for the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index
lack of appeal in the context of collective decision-making procedures. On the one hand, as
often criticized, the "Banzhaf total power" axiom has some unavoidable ad hoc °avor: the
index it helps to characterize is partially within it. On the other hand, the corresponding
axiom for the Shapley-Shubik index, "e±ciency", obvious in other contexts and accepted in
this one by sheer habit, is no more compelling in this context (see Laruelle and Valenciano
(1999)).
In our system only "anonymity", which has a clear and compelling meaning, is pre-
served untouched. The rest of the axioms are substituted by more transparent ones. In
particular our axioms deliberately exclude in a ¯rst step any normalizing ingredient. This
allows us to characterize either index up to the choice of a zero and a unit of scale. The
traditional "null player" axiom is replaced by a more natural and clear assumption about
null players: just that this is the worst role any player can play in a game. "Transfer" is
reformulated in an equivalent but more transparent version stating that the e®ect on the
power of deleting a minimal winning coalition from the set of winning ones is the same in
any game in which this coalition is minimal winning. This kind of "modi¯ed game", the
one resulting from a game by dropping just one minimal winning coalition, is crucial in
our axiomatic system. Then we show that transfer can be replaced by a simpler and more
compelling axiom just stating that the e®ect of dropping one minimal winning coalition
is the same for all players inside (resp., outside) this coalition. Our di®erentiating axioms
are two assumptions concerning again the e®ect of dropping just one minimal winning
coalition in a game. Our substitute for "e±ciency" states that when a minimal winning
coalition is dropped, the total loss in terms of power of the players within this coalition is
equal to the total gain of the members of the complementary coalition, while our substitute
for "Banzhaf total power" states the same in terms of average (instead of total)l o s sa n d
gain. By means of these axioms the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are characterized
up to an additive and a positive multiplicative constants. In other words, up to the choice
of a "zero" and a "unit of scale" for the measure of power. Stripping our axioms in this
way of any normalizing component helps to clarify the role and meaning of each of them.
We also discuss the absolute/relative issue and show how adding two purely normalizing
axioms, the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index are singled out. Finally, we deal
with the extension of the indices to make comparison of power in games with di®erent
numbers of players.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the basic game theoretical background
together with Dubey's, and Dubey and Shapley's characterizations are brie°y reviewed.
In Section 3 we present our axioms and in Section 4 their relationships with the traditional
4ones are established. Section 5 contains the main result of this paper: the characterization
of both power indices up to a multiplicative and an additive constants. In Section 6 the
absolute/relative issue is discussed. Then by adding two normalizing axioms we single
out both indices. Section 7 deals with the extension of the indices to compare the power
of players in situations involving di®erent numbers of players. Finally, Section 8 closes
this paper with some remarks emphasizing the main conclusions of this work and a brief
discussion on some lines for further research.
2B a c k g r o u n d
We recall here the necessary de¯nitions to model a collective decision-making procedure.
A cooperative transferable utility (TU) game is a pair (N;v), where N = f1;:::;ng denotes
the set of players and v a function which assigns a real number to each non-empty subset
or coalition of N,a n dv(;) = 0. The number of players in a coalition S is denoted s.A
(0-1)-game i sag a m ei nw h i c ht h ef u n c t i o nv only takes the values 0 and 1. It is a simple
game if it is not identically 0; and obeys the condition of monotonicity: v(T) ¸ v(S)
whenever T ¶ S. In these games a coalition S is winning if v(S) = 1, and is losing if
v(S) = 0. A winning coalition is minimal if it does not contain any other. A player i is
said to be a swinger in a coalition S if S is winning and Snfig is not. A player i is said to
be a null player if she or he is not a swinger in any coalition, that is, if v(S)=v(S nf ig)
for all S. In a simple game v; W(v)( r e s p . ,M(v)) will denote the set of winning (resp.,
minimal winning) coalitions, and w(v)( r e s p . ,m(v)) its number. Any of these sets, W(v)
or M(v), fully characterizes the game v. For any coalition S µ N,t h eS-unanimity game,





1i f T ¶ S
0o t h e r w i s e .
AT Ug a m ei ssuperadditive if v(S [ T) ¸ v(S)+v(T) whenever S \ T = ;.I n
the context of simple games, the superadditivity property is equivalent to the condition:
v(S)+v(N n S) · 1 for all S ½ N.L e t SGn denote the set of all simple superadditive
n-person games. When N is clear from the context we refer to game (N;v) as game v.
As a collective decision-making procedure is speci¯ed by the voting body and the
decision rules, it can be modelled by a (0-1)-game whose winning coalitions are those
that can make a decision without the vote of the remaining players. We assume that the
decision rules are consistent in the following sense. The unanimity of the players can make
a decision. Any subgroup of a group of voters that cannot make a decision cannot either.
Two nonintersecting groups of voters cannot make decision at the same time. Therefore,
5under these conditions, collective decision-making procedures can be modelled as simple
superadditive games.
A power index is a function © : SGn ! Rn that associates with each simple superaddi-
tive game v a vector or power pro¯le ©(v)w h o s eith component is interpreted as a measure
of the in°uence that player i can exert on the outcome. To evaluate the distribution of
power among the players the two best known power indices are the Shapley-Shubik (1954)





(s ¡ 1)!(n ¡ s)!
n!
(v(S) ¡ v(S nf ig)), i =1 ;:::;n.( 1 )







(v(S) ¡ v(S nf ig)), i =1 ;:::;n.( 2 )
The Shapley-Shubik index was ¯rst axiomatized by Dubey (1975). Dubey and Shapley
(1979) proposed the ¯rst axiomatization of the Banzhaf index. Theorem 1 below contains
their results for the domain of simple superadditive games.
Anonymity (An): For all v 2 SGn; any permutation ¼ of N,a n da n yi 2 N,
©i(¼v)=© ¼(i)(v);
where (¼v)(S): =v(¼(S)).
Null Player (NP): For any v 2 SGn and any i 2 N,i fi is a null player in game v;
then
©i(v)=0 :
Transfer (T): For any v;w 2 SGn such that v _ w 2 SGn;
©(v)+© ( w)=© ( v ^ w)+© ( v _ w);
where (v ^ w)(S): =m i n fv(S);w(S)g and (v _ w)(S): =m a x fv(S);w(S)g.














(v(S) ¡ v(S nf ig)):
Theorem 1 Let ©:SGn ! Rn; then
(i) The only © that satis¯es anonymity (An), null player (NP), transfer (T) and
Shapley total power (ShTP) is the Shapley-Shubik index.
(ii) The only © that satis¯es anonymity (An), null player (NP), transfer (T) and
Banzhaf total power (BzTP) is the Banzhaf index.
3 More transparent axioms
Now we revise Dubey and Shapley's axioms. That is, their axioms are discussed one by
one, and substitutes for almost all of them are proposed: only anonymity (An) will be
kept unchanged. The meaning of this axiom is clear and compelling: the power of each
player in a simple superadditive game does not depend on how the players are labelled.
With respect to the null player (NP) axiom it should be noted that, despite its apparent
plausibility, this axiom isolated just states that the power of any null player in any game
is the same. Postulating that this power is zero means more than just this only once one
adds something else. For instance, that the power of any player in any game is greater
or equal than zero. But this is none of Dubey and Shapley's axioms. In fact, in their
system NP only yields its full meaning together with the other three axioms. So, we will
use instead the following axiom, that we call "null player*" in order to avoid a confusing
and unnecessary multiplicity of names1:
Null Player* (NP*): For all v 2 SGn, and all i 2 N;
i is a null player in v , for all w 2 SGn; ©i(v) · ©i(w):
The axiom is clear and compelling, and makes full sense by itself without requiring
the company of any other. It states that being a null player is the worst role any player
can expect to play, the role that yields a minimal measure of power. Mind the equivalence
postulated in the axiom: it excludes trivial °at measures of power, so, it really says that
being a null player is strictly the worst.
The transfer (T) axiom plays in the context of simple games the same role that linearity
plays for general transferable utility games. It has often been considered opaque (Roth
1We will do the same with our reformulation of transfer, and its abreviation.
7(1977), Stra±n (1982)), and it is particularly obscure in the context of collective decision-
making (Felsenthal and Machover (1995)). We will use an equivalent but more transparent
formulation of this condition. For it and for our other axioms, we need the following
de¯nition that plays a central role in our axiomatization.
De¯nition 1 For any game v 2 SGn such that v 6= uN,a n da n yS 2 M(v), the modi¯ed
game v¤
S i st h eg a m es u c ht h a tW(v¤
S)=W(v) nf Sg.
Thus the modi¯ed game v¤
S results from v by deleting just one single coalition S from
the list of winning ones2. Avoiding starting from the unanimity game and dropping a
minimal winning coalition guarantee that v¤
S 2 SGn. It makes sense for the measurement
of power to evaluate the e®ects of modifying a decision-making rule in such a way that a
coalition that previously could make a decision cannot any more.
Now transfer can be reformulated like this:
Transfer* (T*): For any v;w 2 SGn; and all S 2 M(v) \ M(w)( S 6= N):
©i(v) ¡ ©i(v¤
S)=© i(w) ¡ ©i(w¤
S)( f o ra l li 2 N):
This axiom postulates that the e®ect (gain or loss) on any player's power of eliminating
a single minimal winning coalition from the set of winning ones is the same in any game in
which this coalition is minimal winning. If equivalent to transfer as it will be proved later3,
it seems less opaque. Note that this condition requires, for any S, a relation involving
all games with S as a minimal winning coalition and their modi¯ed forms. Instead we
propose a condition that involves each game and its modi¯ed form. As we will show the
following condition can replace transfer in our characterization.
Symmetric Gain-Loss (SymGL): For all v 2 SGn,a l lS 2 M(v)( S 6= N), and all
i;j 2 S (resp., i;j 2 N n S),
©i(v) ¡ ©i(v¤
S)=© j(v) ¡ ©j(v¤
S):
This assumption states that the e®ect of eliminating a minimal winning coalition is
the same for any two players belonging to it and for any two players outside it. This
axiom is a form of symmetry postulated for each pair v and v¤
S. It is worth noting that
this condition is satis¯ed by any semivalue (Weber (1979, 1988), see also Einy (1987)) and
even by any weak semivalue (Calvo and Santos (1999)) in a weaker form.
2This is the "deletion" used by Weber (1988).
3In fact Dubey and Shapley observe that their axiom can be restated in terms of the e®ect of "changing
the status of a single coalition from minimal winning to maximal losing".
8Now let us consider the di®erentiating axioms in Dubey and Shapley's axiomatization.
What we have called "Shapley total power" is in fact the usual "e±ciency" in the domain
of TU games restricted to simple superadditive games. This condition is so compelling in
the context of TU games that it is often uncritically accepted as natural in any subclass
of TU games. But when simple superadditive games are interpreted as models of collec-
tive decision-making procedures and value as a measure of power, this condition lacks a
compelling interpretation. In this case the 1/0 values of the characteristic function is just
a means to presenting the list of winning and losing coalitions. Thus, a priori, there is no
reason to assume that there is any "cake" of a unit of power to distribute among the play-
ers. Moreover, the situation is similar to that of NP commented above: this "e±ciency"
isolated just states that the total aggregated power of the players is the same in any game.
If the lack of a compelling story for e±ciency in this context, by sheer habit, may
be not perceived at ¯rst sight, the corresponding axiom for the Banzhaf index, that we
have called "Banzhaf total power", raises suspicion at ¯rst sight: the solution it helps to
axiomatize is partly within the axiom.
We will use instead the following two axioms:










Constant Average Gain-Loss Balance (CAGLB): For all v 2 SGn and all S 2













Both axioms again concern the e®ect of dropping a minimal winning coalition from
the list of winning ones. Constant total (resp., average) gain-loss balance postulates that
the total (resp., average) loss of the players in the deleted coalition equals the total (resp.,
average) gain of the players outside it. It is remarkable how close these two axioms are
in their form and requirement: just one word -total/average- separates them. As to their
appeal it seems quite balanced. In fact both conditions are very particular cases of the
following principle involving the average gain and loss and satis¯ed by the semivalues:














where ¸ =( ¸s)s=1;2::;n¡1, is a collection of constants ¸s 2 (0;1):
9It can be shown that each collection ¸ is associated to a particular semivalue. Constant
total gain-loss balance is the particular case ¸s = s
n; while constant average is the particular
case ¸s = 1
2.
These axioms turn out even close to our formulation of transfer (T*) or its substitute
(SymGL). All these axioms postulate something concerning the e®ect of eliminating one
minimal winning coalition on the measurement of power, while the corresponding axioms
in the other existing characterizations do not have anything in common. In Section 5 we
discuss the meaning of this fact.
4 Old and new axioms' relationships
Before proceeding with the main results, we establish some relations between our axioms
and Dubey and Shapley's that will be useful in the proof of the main theorems.
Note that our null player* is neither weaker nor stronger than traditional null player.
The next proposition shows that our substitute together with anonymity implies that all
null player roles are interchangeable or equivalent in the sense of yielding the same measure
of power, the basic meaning of null player as commented before.
Proposition 1 Anonymity (An) together with null player* (NP*) implies that for all
i;j 2 N,a n da l lv;w 2 SGn,i fi is a null player in v,a n dj is a null player in w,t h e n
©i(v)=© j(w):
Proof. Let i be a null player in a game v,a n dl e tw be any other game. Let ¼ be the
permutation on N interchanging i and j,t h a ti s ,
¼(k): =
8
> > > <
> > > :
j; if k = i;
i; if k = j;
k otherwise.
Then by NP* and An we have ©i(v) · ©i(¼w)=© ¼(i)(w)=© j(w), and the conclusion
follows immediately.
For the sake of completeness we prove the equivalence of transfer and our reformulation
of it.
Proposition 2 Transfer (T) and transfer* (T*) are equivalent.
10Proof. ())L e tv;w 2 SGn; and S 2 M(v) \ M(w)( S 6= N). Then v¤
S;w¤
S 2 SGn and
v = v¤
S _ uS and w = w¤
S _ uS. Then, by T, we have
©(v)=© ( v¤
S _ uS)=© ( v¤
S)+© ( uS) ¡ ©(v¤
S ^ uS)
©(w)=© ( w¤
S _ uS)=© ( w¤
S)+© ( uS) ¡ ©(w¤
S ^ uS):
Note that v¤
S ^ uS = w¤
S ^ uS =( uS)¤
S, hence T* follows immediately.
(() Conversely, let v;w 2 SGn s. t. v _ w 2 SGn: Note W(v ^ w)=W(v) \ W(w)
and W(v _ w)=W(v) [ W(w). That is, W(v _ w) n W(w)=W(v) n W(v ^ w): This
means that reaching w from v _ w takes dropping one by one exactly the same winning
coalitions (a minimal one in the current game each time) than reaching v ^w from v.B y
T* the e®ect on the index of deleting a minimal wining coalition is the same in any game,
consequently, ©(v _ w) ¡ ©(w)=© ( v) ¡ ©(v ^ w):
As to our substitute for transfer, that is, symmetric gain-loss, it is independent of
transfer. That is, it does not imply nor is implied by transfer. But the following proposition
and next example show that our condition is weaker than transfer if anonymity is assumed.
Proposition 3 Anonymity (An) together with transfer* (T*) implies symmetric gain-loss
(SymGL).
Proof. First observe that for any game v, any permutation ¼,a n da n yS 2 M(¼v),
it is (¼v)¤
S = ¼(v¤
¼(S)). This can easily be proved checking that both games have the
same set of winning coalitions. Now let v 2 SGn, S 2 M(v), and i;j 2 S (i 6= j).
Let ¼ be the permutation on N interchanging i and j, as in the proof of Proposition






S)= © i(¼v) ¡ ©i((¼v)¤
S)= © i(¼v) ¡ ©i(¼(v¤
S))
=© ¼(i)(v) ¡ ©¼(i)(v¤
S)= © j(v) ¡ ©j(v¤
S):
The proof for i;j 2 N n S is entirely similar.
The following example shows that the converse is not true.
Example: Let © : SG3 ! R3 be the index that associates to each three person game
the vector below (in the other cases just extend © anonymously):
If M(v)=ff1gg then ©(v)=( 1 ;0;0);
if M(v)=ff1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3gg then ©(v)=( 0 :8;0:8;0:8);
if M(v)=ff1;2g;f1;3gg then ©(v)=( 0 :9;0:3;0:3);
11if M(v)=ff1;2gg then ©(v)=( 0 :6;0:6;0);
if M(v)=ff1;2;3gg then ©(v)=( 0 :2;0:2;0:2):
Then © satis¯es AN and SymGL. But, for each two person coalition, ©i(v) ¡ ©i(v¤
S),
depending on the game, takes the values 0:5; 0:3a n d0 :4. Thus © does not satisfy T*.
The following proposition shows that "constant total power" would be perfectly justi-
¯ed as an alternative name for constant total gain-loss balance. In other words, this axiom
captures exactly the essential meaning of the Shapley total power or "e±ciency" axiom
commented above: the sum of the power of all the players in any game is the same.
Proposition 4 Constant total gain-loss balance (CTGLB) is equivalent to requiring that















T h u si ti si m p l i e db yt h ea bo v ec o n s t a n t - s u mr e q u i r e m e n t .T os e et h ec o n v e r s en o t et h a tf o r
any game v,b yr e p e a t e d l ya p p l y i n g( :)¤
S, that is, by repeatedly deleting minimal winning
coalitions one by one, the N-unanimity game uN is ¯nally reached. So, by repeatedly











Thus constant-sum follows immediately.
Finally, the following lemma, that gives the e®ect of dropping a minimal winning
c o a l i t i o no nb o t hp o w e ri n d i c e s ,w i l lb eo fu s ei nt h ep r o o fo ft h em a i nt h e o r e m .I ts h o w s
that the e®ect depends on the size of the coalition and the number of players for the
Shapley-Shubik index while it only depends on the number of players for the Banzhaf
index.
Lemma 1 The e®ect on a player's power (measured by either index) of dropping one







n! if i 2 S;
¡
s!(n¡s¡1)!








2n¡1 if i 2 S;
¡ 1
2n¡1 if i 2 N n S.
(4)
Proof. It easily follows from formulae (1) and (2), observing that for any S 2 M(v)
(S 6= N), the di®erence between v and v¤
S is that in v¤
S any i 2 S is not a swinger in S
any more, while any i 2 N n S becomes a swinger in S [f ig.
125 Main characterization
Now, we have the main result in this paper: by replacing in Dubey and Shapley's systems
their axioms by ours, both indices are characterized up to the choice of a zero and a unit
of scale for the measure of power.
Theorem 2 Let ©:SGn ! Rn; then
(i) © satis¯es anonymity (An), null player* (NP*), symmetric gain-loss (SymGL) and
constant total gain-loss balance (CTGLB) if and only if it is ©=®Sh+·1,f o rs o m e®>0
and · 2 R,w h e r e1 :=( 1 ;:::;1) 2 Rn:
(ii) © satis¯es anonymity (An), null player* (NP*), symmetric gain-loss (SymGL)
and constant average gain-loss balance (CAGLB) if and only if it is ©=®Bz + ·1,f o r
some ®>0 and · 2 R.
Proof. (i): (()L e t©=®Sh + ·1,w i t h®>0a n d· 2 R.S i n c eSh satis¯es An, NP*
and (Lemma 1) SymGL and CTGLB, it follows easily that so does © = ®Sh + ·1.
()) Conversely, let © be an index satisfying An, NP*, SymGL and CTGLB. By An,
NP* and Proposition 1, the value of the index for any null player in any game is the same.
Let · denote this number and let ©0 be the index ©0 := © ¡ ·1. It is immediate that ©0




i(uN)( b yA nt h i s
value does not depend on i, and by NP and NP* it is positive). We will prove by induction
on the number of winning coalitions that for any v 2 SGn,© 0(v)=®Sh(v):
If w(v) = 1, it means that v = uN,a n d © 0(uN)=®Sh(uN) by the choice of ®.
Now assume ©0(w)=®Sh(w) for any game w with a smaller number of winning
coalitions than v. Two cases are possible.




S)) = (n ¡ s)(©0
j((uS)¤
S) ¡ ©0
j(uS)) (8i 2 S; 8j 2 N n S):
Now, for any j 2 N n S,b yN P ,© 0
j(uS)=0=®Shj(uS), and, by the induction
hypothesis, ©0((uS)¤
S)=®Sh((uS)¤























So, the claim is proved for the case m(v)=1 :
2nd case: m(v) > 1; i. e., there are at least two di®erent minimal winning coalitions
S and T in game v. This means that by dropping ¯rst S,a n dt h e nT; or the other way












For any game w 2 SGn,a n yS 2 M(w)( S 6= N) and any i 2 N,d e n o t eb y¢ S;i(w)





By SymGL and CTGLB it is
s¢S;i(w)=¡(n ¡ s)¢S;j(w)( 8i 2 S; 8j 2 N n S):
On the other hand, by the induction hypothesis, these di®erences are ®-times the ones
given by (3) (Lemma 1) for any game in both paths "below" v. This means that each
time a coalition of size r is dropped in either path (at least beyond the ¯rst step, in which










are the same, for each player the sum of these di®erences must be the same for both paths.
Let then i 2 S \T and j 2 T n S (such i and j do exist, for the game v is superadditive).







Now, by SymGL, ¢T;i(v)=¢ T;j(v)a n d¢ T;i(v¤
S)=¢ T;j(v¤
S), then
¢S;i(v) ¡ ¢S;j(v)=¢ S;i(v¤
T) ¡ ¢S;j(v¤
T);
and by SymGL and CTGLB, ¡s
























n! if k 2 S;
¡®
s!(n¡s¡1)!
n! if k 2 N n S.
14This, together with Lemma 1 and the fact that by the induction hypothesis ©0(v¤
S)=
®Sh(v¤
S), entails that ©0(v)=®Sh(v), too. Thus, ¯nally, © = ©0 + ·1 = ®Sh + ·1:
(ii): (()L e t©=®Bz + ·1,w i t h®>0a n d· 2 R. Bz satis¯es An and NP*.
From Lemma 1 it follows immediately that it satis¯es also SymGL and CAGLB. Then it
is immediate that © = ®Bz + ·1 satis¯es also the four axioms.
()) The proof of the converse is very similar to that of the second part of (i), and
follows the same steps. Let © be an index satisfying An, NP*, SymGL and CAGLB. By
An, NP* and Proposition 1, the value of the index for any null player in any game is the
same. Let · denote this number and let ©0 be the index ©0 := © ¡ ·1.T h e n© 0 satis¯es




i(uN) (by An this value
does not depend on i, and by NP and NP* it is positive). Proceeding by induction on the
number of winning coalitions we will prove that for any v 2 SGn,© 0(v)=®Bz(v):
If w(v) = 1, it means that v = uN,a n d © 0(uN)=®Bz(uN) by the choice of ®.
Now assume ©0(w)=®Bz(w) for any game w with a smaller number of winning
coalitions than v. Again we distinguish two cases.







j(uS)( 8i 2 S; 8j 2 N n S):
Now, for any j 2 N n S,b yN P ,© 0
j(uS)=0=®Bzj(uS), and, by the induction
hypothesis, ©0((uS)¤
S)=®Bz((uS)¤








2n¡1 = ® 1
2s¡1 = ®Bzi(uS):
So, the claim is proved for the case m(v)=1 :
2nd case: m(v) > 1; i. e., there are at least two di®erent minimal winning coalitions S
and T in game v. This means that, as in the second part of (i), by dropping S and T in
either order the same game is reached. Now setting ¢S;i(w): =© 0
i(w) ¡ ©0
i(w¤
S)a si n( i ) .
By SymGL and CAGLB it is
¢S;i(w)=¡¢S;j(w)( 8i 2 S; 8j 2 N n S):
On the other hand, by the induction hypothesis, these di®erences are now ®-times the
ones given by (4) (see Lemma 1) for any game in both paths "below" v.T h u se a c ht i m e
a coalition of size r is dropped in either path (beyond the ¯rst step, in which S or T is
dropped), the power of any player within (resp., outside) it decreases (resp., increases) in
® 1
2n¡1. A sb o t ht h eo r i g i na n dt h ee n da r et h es a m e ,f o re a c hp l a y e rt h es u mo ft h e s e
di®erences must be the same for both paths. Let then i 2 S \T and j 2 T nS (such i and
15j do exist, for the game v is superadditive). Then, setting equal the e®ects on i and on j;







Now, by SymGL, ¢T;i(v)=¢ T;j(v)a n d¢ T;i(v¤
S)=¢ T;j(v¤
S), then
¢S;i(v) ¡ ¢S;j(v)=¢ S;i(v¤
T) ¡ ¢S;j(v¤
T);
a n db yS y m G La n dC A G L B ,¡¢S;i(v)=¢ S;j(v)a n d¡¢S;i(v¤
T)=¢ S;j(v¤
T). From which








2n if k 2 S;
¡® 1
2n if k 2 N n S.
This, together with Lemma 1 and the fact that by the induction hypothesis ©0(v¤
S)=
®Bz(v¤
S), entails that ©0(v)=®Bz(v), too. Thus, ¯nally, © = ©0 + ·1 = ®Bz + ·1:
In view of Proposition 3, we have as an immediate corollary of the previous theorem
the following one, closer to that of Dubey and Shapley, in which their axioms have been
stripped of their normalizing secondary ingredients and their di®erentiating axioms have
been substituted by ours.
Theorem 3 Let ©:SGn ! Rn; then
(i) © satis¯es anonymity (An), null player* (NP*), transfer* (T*) and constant total
gain-loss balance (CTGLB) if and only if it is ©=®Sh+·1,f o rs o m e®>0 and · 2 R.
(ii) © satis¯es anonymity (An), null player* (NP*), transfer* (T*) and constant av-
erage gain-loss balance (CAGLB) if and only if it is ©=®Bz + ·1,f o rs o m e®>0 and
· 2 R.
Some comments are worth here. First, the proof of the theorem sheds some light on
the crucial role that the modi¯ed game plays in our characterization. Axiomatizing an
index on the ¯nite set SGn requires the support of some structure, and in this case the
most natural and signi¯cant structure is that of a lower semilattice with uN as minimal
element, if SGn is provided with the partial order v · w , W(v) µ W(w). Then an
axiomatization can be naturally grounded one way or another on some kind of inductive
axioms involving this partial order. This can be done implicitly, as in Dubey's transfer,
or explicitly, as in our transfer* and other axioms, using the basic step v ! v¤
S (note that
v and v¤
S are "consecutive" in the sense that v<v ¤
S and there is no game w such that
v<w<v ¤
S).
16Second, observe that in the proof of Theorem 2 the superadditivity of the game has
been used. This raises the mathematical question of the validity of these results in the
domain of general simple games, without requiring superadditivity. The answer is positive
at least for Theorem 3 (note that under T* the case m(v) > 1 in the second part of (i) and
(ii) is trivial, for this yields directly ¢S;i(v)=¢ S;i(v¤
T)). As to Theorem 2, the question
remains open.
Finally, the question of the independence of the axioms can be addressed. The following
examples show the independence of any of the axioms we have used with respect to the
others in either system (in brackets the uninteresting for obvious "yes" and "noes"), but
that of transfer* and symmetric gain-loss with respect to anonymity, null player* and
constant average gain-loss balance, still unsettled.
Example An NP* SymGL T/T* CTGLB CAGLB
©i(v)=Shi(v)+·i (·i 6= ·j) No Yes Yes Yes Yes (No)
©i(v)=Bzi(v)+·i (·i 6= ·j) No Yes Yes Yes (No) Yes
©(v)=0 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
©(v)=Bz(v) Yes Yes Yes Yes No (Yes)
©(v)=Sh(v) Yes Yes Yes Yes (Yes) No
©(v)=
Bz(v) P
i2N Bzi(v) Yes Yes No No Yes (No)
9©(v)? Yes Yes No No (No) Yes
6 Normalization
Thus, we have two families of power indices de¯ned up to two constants on SGn,
SH := f®Sh + ·1 : ®>0;· 2 Rg;
BZ := f®Bz + ·1 : ®>0;· 2 Rg:
Any two indices in the same of either of these two families are indistinguishable through
the axioms we have used so far and are equivalent in the sense that they rank identically
the power of any two players in any two games. Moreover, any such a pair di®ers only in
the zero and the unit of scale. In principle these two degrees of freedom are natural in any
measure.
This allows to make a clear classi¯cation of some indices that have been proposed in the
literature. The Banzhaf index (® = 1 and · = 0), the "raw" Banzhaf (® =2 n¡1 and · =0 )
and the Rae (1969) index (® =2 n¡1 and · =2 n¡1) belong to BZ, while this family does not
contain the "normalized" Banzhaf index, nor the Coleman indices (Coleman (1971, 1973),
17see also Brams and A®uso (1976)). Therefore the "normalized" Banzhaf index, which is
obtained by multiplying the power of a player in di®erent games by di®erent constants,
is by no means equivalent to the Banzhaf index, it displays di®erent properties (and
paradoxes). This trivial fact does not seem to have been well understood in the literature.
Similarly, Brams and A®uso (1976) do the same mistake with the Coleman indices that
they consider as equivalent to the normalized Banzhaf index (see also Felsenthal and
Machover (1995)).
There has been some discussion in the literature on the issue of the character absolute
or relative of the power indices. It has sometimes been argued that relative indices were
those which add up to 1 (see Roth (1977), Felsenthal and Machover (1995)). We try to
make this point clear by subdividing the above families into smaller equivalence classes
from the absolute/relative point of view, from which not any pair of indices in the same
family are equivalent any more.
An index © : SGn ! Rn is relative if what matters in the information summarized by
© are the proportions
©i(v)
©j(w), for any two players and any two games. An index is absolute
if what matters in the information summarized by © are the di®erences ©i(v) ¡ ©j(w),
for any two players and any two games. Consistent with this distinction, we have the
following
De¯nition 2 Let ©;ª:SGn ! Rn,t h e n
(i) © and ª are relatively equivalent, written © »R ª; if







(ii) © and ª are absolutely equivalent, written © »A ª; if
8v;w 2 SGn; 8i;j 2 N :© i(v) ¡ ©j(w)=ª i(v) ¡ ªj(w):
To avoid the problem of dividing by zero, the relative equivalence condition should be
rewritten more properly like this
8v;w 2 SGn; 8i;j 2 N :© i(v)ªj(w)=ª i(v)©j(w):
It is immediate to check that both are equivalence relations. Thus, they subdivide any
family of indices into equivalence classes. The following proposition (whose easy proof
we omit) states that in either family relatively equivalent indices share the "zero", but
possibly not the "scale", while absolutely equivalent indices share the "scale", but possibly
not the "zero".
18Proposition 5 Let ©;ª:SGn ! Rn be both in the same of any of the two families SH
or BZ.T h e n
(i) © »R ª if and only if there exists a constant k>0 such that ©=kª:
(ii) © »A ª if and only if there exists a constant k such that ©=ª+k1:
Therefore each of the two indices, Sh or Bz is relatively (resp., absolutely) equivalent
to any index obtained by multiplying it by a positive constant (resp., adding to it a
constant). Consistently with these subdivision of the families, the following purely and
properly speaking normalizing axioms, together with those that characterize the families
SH and BZ, permit to single out the classes of indices relatively equivalent and absolutely
equivalent to Sh and to Bz:
Zero Power (ZP): For any i 2 N,m i n v2SGn ©i(v)=0 .
Unit of Power (UP): For any i 2 N,m a x v2SGn ©i(v) ¡ minv2SGn ©i(v)=1 .
The ¯rst axiom sets the zero by stating that this is the minimal power of any player,
while the second one ¯xes the unit of scale as the range of power of any player. Adding
any of these axioms or both to the ones that characterize the families SH and BZ,o n e
or both degrees of freedom are eliminated. ZP sets the zero, and UP the scale. Whence
the following results are straightforward:
Theorem 4 An index ©:SGn ! Rn satis¯es anonymity (An), null player* (NP*),
transfer* (T*) or symmetric gain-loss (SymGL), constant total gain-loss balance (CT-
GLB), and, respectively,
(i) zero power (ZP) if and only if it is ©=®Sh,f o rs o m e®>0.
(ii) unit of power (UP) if and only if it is ©=Sh+ ·1,f o rs o m e· 2 R.
(iii) zero power (ZP) and unit of power (UP) if and only if it is ©=Sh.
Theorem 5 An index ©:SGn ! Rn satis¯es anonymity (An), null player* (NP*),
transfer* (T*) or symmetric gain-loss (SymGL), constant average gain-loss balance (CAGLB),
and, respectively,
(i) zero power (ZP) if and only if it is ©=®Bz,f o rs o m e®>0.
(ii) unit of power (UP) if and only if it is ©=Bz + ·1,f o rs o m e· 2 R.
(iii) zero power (ZP) and unit of power (UP) if and only if it is ©=Bz.
The comparison with Dubey and Shapley is interesting here. Their systems include
indistinctly and implicitly some normalizing principles embodied in their axioms. In their
systems null player, Shapley total power and also Banzhaf total power embody some
19normalizing implications that only come into e®ect once they combine with the other
axioms. Our systems instead separate carefully any normalizing principle from the intrinsic
properties of the proposed measure.
As to the absolute/relative issue, we stress the fact that from this point of view (in
the unique precise sense that we can think of for this dichotomy), the situation is entirely
symmetric for both indices. In other words, we see no grounds to say that Sh is relative
while Bz is absolute. Both indices can be used in principle as relative or as absolute
indices.
7 Variable number of players
So far the number of players considered has been ¯xed. We deal now with the speci¯cation
of indices to assess the power of players in voting procedures involving any number of
players. This entails comparisons of the power of di®erent players in di®erent processes
involving possibly di®erent numbers of players.
To deal with a variable number of players the framework needs to be adjusted. One
option is assuming a universe of players as in Shapley (1953). Alternatively one can
use the domain SG := [n¸1SGn. Thus an index in this case is a collection of maps © =
f©n : SGn ! Rn: n =1 ;2;:::g. Assuming the axioms that characterize the aforementioned
families for each number n of players -that in what follows to avoid ambiguity we call SHn
(resp., BZn) and similarly Shn (resp., Bzn)-, it yields the family of indices given by
collections f©n = ®nShn + ·n1 : n =1 ;2;:::g (resp., f©n = ®nBzn + ·n1 : n =1 ;2;:::g),
where ®n are positive numbers and ·n arbitrary numbers. To single out an index from
this family some principles must be postulated relating the power of players in games with
di®erent numbers of players. Natural references for such a comparison are what intuitively
are the extreme roles: null players and dictators.
Null Players Equivalence (NPEQ): The power of any two null players in any two
games, whatever their number of players, is the same.
Dictator Players Equivalence (DPEQ): The power of any two dictators in any two
games, whatever their number of players, is the same.
Adding the ¯rst principle to the former systems yields that for all m;n ¸ 0, ·n = ·m.
Adding both equivalence principles yields in addition that for all m;n ¸ 1, ®n = ®m.S o ,
we have the natural extension of Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 6 Let ©=f©n : SGn ! Rn: n =1 ;2;:::g; then
20(i) © satis¯es anonymity (An), null player* (NP*), transfer* (T*) or symmetric gain-
loss (SymGL) and constant total gain-loss balance (CTGLB) on SGn (for any n ¸ 1),
and the null players (NPEQ) and dictator players (DPEQ) equivalence principles if and
only if it is, for some ®>0 and · 2 R,
©=f©n = ®Shn + ·1 : n =1 ;2;:::g:
(ii) © satis¯es anonymity (An), null player* (NP*), transfer* (T*) or symmetric gain-
loss (SymGL) and constant average gain-loss balance (CAGLB) on SGn (for any n ¸ 1),
and the null players (NPEQ) and dictator players (DPEQ) equivalence principles if and
only if, for some ®>0 and · 2 R,
©=f©n = ®Bzn + ·1 : n =1 ;2;:::g:
Finally, adding similar normalizing assumptions to those used in the former subsec-
t i o n ,b o t hi n d i c e s ,t h a ti s ,Sh = fShn: n =1 ;2;:::g and Bz = fBzn: n =1 ;2;:::g are
characterized. Note here the di®erence between Banzhaf and "raw" Banzhaf. The ¯rst
one is singled out (up the two constants) adding the former two simple equivalence prin-
ciples. But for "raw" Banzhaf no simple equivalence principle together with null players
equivalence principle characterizes it.
8 Concluding remarks
In some sense this paper is a new turn of the screw, twenty years later, in the original
motivation of Dubey and Shapley's to ¯nd a set of axioms from which to derive the Banzhaf
index comparable to that obtained by Dubey (1975) for the Shapley-Shubik index:
"..up to now, the S-S index has attracted the lion's share of attention from game the-
orists, partly because of certain perceived naturalness in its mathematical foundations and
partly as a by-product of research devoted to its parent solution concept, the "Shapley
value" for general cooperative games. With the idea of redressing this imbalance, we have
undertaken here to investigate the Bz index from a mathematical point of view." (Dubey
and Shapley, 1979).
The original motivation of this paper was in fact redressing this imbalance even further.
In particular, Dubey and Shapley's pair of di®erentiating axioms for the Shapley-Shubik
index and the Banzhaf index seemed to us rather asymmetric concerning their appeal.
On one hand, "e±ciency", with the favorable prejudice from most game theorists. On the
other, a strange axiom with some ad hoc °avor. For us it was clear from the very beginning
that e±ciency was arguable in the context of simple games as models of decision-making
21procedures (Laruelle and Valenciano (1999)), but balanced substitutes for e±ciency and
the corresponding axiom for Banzhaf were needed to show how super¯cial this asymmetry
was.
In this search we were driven to ¯nd transparent alternatives for Dubey and Shapley's
axioms, stripping them of their "normalizing" secondary ingredients. Our formulation
of transfer seems more transparent than Dubey's and sheds some light on the meaning
of this condition. Then transfer was replaced by a more simple and compelling assump-
tion, symmetric gain-loss. In the case of the dichotomy "e±ciency" (or, in our more
neutral terms, "Shapley total power") versus "Banzhaf total power", this is achieved by
the alternative dichotomy "constant total/average gain-loss balance". These axioms are
remarkably close, both being a special case of a general principle satis¯ed by the semival-
ues. Moreover, both have a clear meaning and are similarly compelling. Thus both indices
appear on a same footing when they are interpreted as measures of power in collective
decision-making procedures. Moreover, our characterizations, separating neatly the purely
normalizing conventions, contribute to a better understanding of the common mistake of
considering equivalent the Banzhaf index, its "normalization", the Coleman indices and
the Rae index.
It is worth stressing the crucial role that the modi¯ed game, resulting from dropping
just one minimal winning coalition in a game, plays in our axiomatic systems. It arose
involved in what we think is a more clear and transparent way of stating Dubey's transfer.
But signi¯cantly it appears also in other axioms as "symmetric gain-loss", "constant total
gain-loss balance" and "constant average gain-loss balance". While in the traditional
characterization the corresponding axioms (namely "transfer", "e±ciency" and "Banzhaf
total power") do not share any common feature. Interestingly enough, this modi¯ed game
appears also naturally if Young's (1985) coalitional monotonicity is restricted to simple
games.
Finally, the results presented in this paper suggest several lines for further research.
First, investigating the meaning of the axioms used here in the domain considered by us in
Laruelle and Valenciano (1998), that is, the convex hull of the set of simple superadditive
games, interpretable as lotteries on collective decision processes. Second, a similar critical
review of the axiomatization of other semivalues as well as of other power indices proposed
in the literature would be interesting. Third, it is worth studying the possibility of adapting
or extending our axioms to the domain of general TU games.
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